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SYMBOLIC LOGIC
One legal tool which is not machine operated but is helpful
in the study of computer technology and its applications to law
is symbolic logic. But this tool is also helpful to the attorney
who is not at all interested in computers; it will help improve his
understanding of the profession's basic tool: the English language.

LOGIC-LANGUAGE-LAW
by Layman E. Allen
When examined as a tool useful for lawyers, symbolic logic
is perhaps best viewed as a language. It can be regarded as a
carefully and precisely constructed language that has been
expressly designed for explicit purposes, rather than one that
has evolved haphazardly through time in the manner of the
natural languages. As a language that is, by careful design,
better in some respects for some purposes than natural languages
are, it can help fulfill some of the communications functions of
language more effectively than is likely to be the case when
natural languages alone are relied upon. To the extent that
language is important in law, symbolic logic has a corresponding
pervasiveness. To the extent that language is important in the
expression and communication of ideas, symbolic logic can help
improve that expression and communication. To the extent that
language is required in thinking, symbolic logic can help improve
the quality of thought. To the extent that language is involved
in the storage and retrieval of information, symbolic logic can
help improve the effectiveness of that process.
Is the thrust of such comment a recommendation that lawyers learn symbolic logic and forget English? Not at all. It is a
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supplement to, not a substitute for, the communicator's native
tongue. Just as arithmetic is a useful adjunct to English for
more effectively and efficiently dealing with a certain class of
problems, so also symbolic logic provides assistance in coping
with other problems that are frequently dealt with rather crudely
and sloppily in contemporary legal prose. At present, the most
significant implications of symbolic logic for law lie in its
potentialities for helping to improve the quality of legal prose
as a means of communicating ideas. In this sense, it is useful
as a private tool of analysis-a language for communicating to
self. But for purposes of communicating to others in law at this
point in time, to recommend symbolic logic as a vehicle would
be about as appropriate as counselling an Albuquerque attorney
to put his briefs into Sanskrit. For now, certainly, if the goal is
for some judge or other attorney to get the message, the results
of the privately conducted analysis in symbolic logic had better
be transformed into straightforward English. But even this
qualification may need to be eased somewhat in the future. The
profound changes currently being wrought in the mathematics
curriculum for kindergarten through college are affecting the
picture. Today we certainly have no hesitation in communicating
an idea in arithmetical notation-e. g., you cannot give ten thousand dollars to each of the fifteen nieces and get it all in the sixty
thousand dollar estate tax exclusion because:
$10,000 X 15 = $150,000
The day is not too distant when logical notation will be just
as pervasive in American culture (and that of all other modem
societies) as arithmetic is today. It will then be just as commonplace to encounter and to use in ordinary legal communication
something like the following:

Pl
P2

NApq
CNpAqr

C3
r
N AoKi, Co, AoN o
as a justification for rejecting premiss Pl in the context where P2
is given because the combination leads to the unwarranted consequence C3. But such is not appropriate-yet.
Where legal prose badly needs to be improved-and symbolic
logic can help-is in the more effective management of its syntax.
What seems to be wholly missing in current legal prose is any
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sense that syntax is amenable to standardization in ways that
are useful for purposes of improving communication. The result,
if a schoolboy failed to stipulate a standard notation and number
base in doing arithmetic, would resemble much of current handling
of syntax in legal prose:
[six - 3 plus V + (lOOO)two] = tH-1
It is possible to puzzle out the message from the context, but
one needs to work at it harder than is necessary.
A relatively simple example from the marital deduction section of the Internal Revenue Code will illustrate how one type
of syntax problem can be handled more astutely than is currently
typical in legal drafting. The sentence to be examined is the
first one in IRC Section 2056(b)(l).*
2056. BEQUESTS, ETC., TO SURVIVING SPOUSE.
(b) Limitation in the Case of Life Estate or Other Terminable Interest.St
(1) General Rule.-Where, on the lapse of time, on the
occurrence of an event or contingency, or on the failure of an
event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving
spouse will terminate or fail,
S2 no deduction shall be allowed under this section with respect to
such interestS3
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed
(for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other
than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse);
and
S4
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his
heirs or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such
property after such termination or failure of the interest
so passing to the surviving spouse;
SS and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest
S6 ( even if such deduction is not disallowed under sub paragraphs
(A) and (B) )S7
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving
spouse, pursuant to directions of the decedent, by his
executor or by the trustee of a trust.
The words that express the syntax relating the various constituents of this sentence in Sec. 2056(b)(l) can be emphasized
by abbreviating the sentence-constituents as follows:
SEC.

• Italics have been added to indicate the seven constituent sentences.
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Where Sl, S2-(A) if S3; and (B) if S4;
and SS (even if S6)-(C) if S7.
This sentence is not atypical of the syntax of legal prose, and
is certainly not one of the more complicated examples that can
be found. Some exposure to symbolic logic can make a reader
or writer of such prose considerably more sensitive to an understanding that the same idea can be expressed more simply. The
simplification required is in the syntax. This is the aspect of
current legal prose that is most ponderous and crude. Some
appreciation of the logicians' concept of a normal-form could be a
boon to legal draftsmanship. It could lead to general perception
that all legal norms can be written as implications-i. e.:
If I a specified set of con-, then
ditions is fulfilled,

I

a certain set of legal
consequences follow.

l

Notice the simplification achieved when the sentence from Sec.
2056(b) ( 1) is cast into such form with redundancies eliminated:
If S1 and (a) S3 and S4 or (b) S7, then S2.
Expressed as an arrow-diagram, it would be:
S3-S47
>-S1- [S __j
)S2
7
with '>--' representing 'if', '-' representing 'and' ' [ ]'
representing 'or', and '-->' representing 'then'. In transforming the present version of the sentence into a normalized
implication, three assumptions have been made:
1. That S6 is redundant, and its elimination does not change
the content of the sentence;
2. that the omission of the words 'in this section' from
SS were not intended to differentiate SS from S2-i. e.,
that SS is just an elliptical way of stating the same idea
stated by S2-and hence, SS is redundant, and its elimination does not change the content of the sentence;
3. that the contents of S3 and S4 make clear that:

>-... [

S3-S4"-i

_J~SZ

is the appropriate interpretation of:
... S3-(A) if S4; and (B) if S5; ...
rather than :

53

>-- ..

TJ

~ S 2 and>- ...

Isl

~S2
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although the latter is more frequently indicated by such syntax.
Transformed back into text, the sentence would be expressed:
(1) General Rule

If
a. on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an
event or contingency to occur, an interest passing
to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, and
b. 1) a. an interest in such property passes or
has passed (for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's
worth) from the decedent to any person
other than such surviving spouse ( or the
estate of such spouse), and
b. by reason of such passing such person
( or his heirs or assigns) may possess or
enjoy any part of such property after
such termination or failure of the interest
so passing to the surviving spouse, or
2) such interest is to be acquired for the surv1vmg spouse, pursuant to the directions
of the decedent, by his executor or by the
trustee of a trust,
then
c. no deduction shall be allowed under this section
with respect to such interest.
It is suggested that this normalized ver&ion of the sentence from
Sec. 2056(b) (1) is considerably easier for human readers to comprehend and work with, and it has been noted elsewhere that
expression in this form facilitates analysis of the statement by
machines. Allen, Layman E., "Beyond Document Retrieval
Toward Information Retrieval", 47 Minn. L. Rev. 713 (1963)
The analysis and simplification of syntax in the example
above has been restricted to the syntax relating complete sentences. The situation is much more complex and interesting
when the syntax between non-sentence parts of sentences is
examined. Considerably more ambiguity, as well as complexity,
is encountered at the intra-sentence level of analysis.
This abbreviated and summary discussion of the way that
symbolic logic seems to be most relevant to lawyers has focussed
on its potential role in improving communication wherever that
is important in law. The results of one way of standardizing
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the syntax between sentences for legal literature has been exemplified. The most significant result of some exposure to symbolic
logic by lawyers is more elusive-difficult to pin down or illustrate. This is its effect upon the exposee's way of thinking.
It is only after taking the plunge that one begins to fully appreciate the perceptiveness and dimension of Jane Taylor's remark:
Though man a thinking being is defin'd,
Few use the grand prerogative of mind.
How few think justly of the thinking few.
How many never think, who think they do.

